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Abstract
The study of interdependent complex networks in the last decade has shown
how cascading failure can result in the recursive and complete fragmentation of
all connected systems from the destruction of a comparatively small number of
nodes. Existing “network of networks” approaches are still in infancy and have
shown limits when trying to model the robustness of real-world systems, due to
simplifying assumptions regarding network interdependencies and post-attack
viability. In order to increase the realism of such models, we challenge such
assumptions by validating the following four hypotheses trough experimental
results obtained from computer based simulations. Firstly, we suggest that, in the
case of network topologies vulnerable to fragmentation, replacing the standard
measure of robustness based on the size of the one largest remaining connected
component by a new measure allowing secondary components to remain viable
when measuring post-attack viability can make a significant improvement to the
model. Secondly, we show that it is possible to influence the way failure
propagation is balanced between coupled networks while keeping the same overall
robustness score by allowing nodes in a given network to have multiple counter
parts in another network. Thirdly, we challenge the generalised assumption that
partitioning between networks is a good way to increase robustness and find that
isolation is a force as equally destructive as the iterative propagation of cascading
failure. This result significantly alters where the optimum robustness lies in the
balance between isolation and inter-network coupling in such interconnected
systems. Finally, we propose a solution to the consequent problem of seemingly
ever increasing vulnerability of interdependent networks to both cascading failure
and isolation: the use of permutable nodes that would give such systems rewiring
capabilities. This last concept could have wide implications when trying to
improve the topological resilience of natural or engineered interdependent
networks.
Keywords: resilience; robustness; interdependent networks; symbiotic networks
Introduction
Avoiding a financial crisis, tackling global warming, or creating resilient infrastruc-
tures are problems that require researchers to look at the world from a “system of
systems” perspective. Indeed, studying such physical or social systems in isolation
does not grant sufficient information to capture the dynamics of an environment
where global and local events result from the emergent complexity of interactions
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between different interdependent entities. Although network theory cannot in its
present infant state model accurately real life interconnected complex networks
such as infrastructures in all their complexity, it has nonetheless become a useful
tool to discover certain basic topological rules that even these complex structures
follow when confronted with cascading failure. Recent work modelling the robust-
ness of “network of networks” [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] has indeed demonstrated that taking
into account the interdependencies between connected systems gives very different
outcomes due to phenomena such as the amplification of the propagation of cas-
cading failures. The state of the art of network theory as a high-level modelling
tool broadly stems from two different sources: mathematical models inspired from
statistical physics and computer graph based simulations. As this field of research
is still in infancy, such models are presently inevitably limited when trying to tackle
complex real world networks from a practical point of view. We therefore limit the
scope of this work to a study of network topology robustness to node removal in
an abstract context, and avoid claims of modelling the functional robustness of real
infrastructure networks, or any sort of risk analysis based on practical engineering
concepts. This being said, we believe that some of the improvements we suggest
to the network theory based model of robustness for coupled networks can be used
to derive some potentially useful mechanisms to protect engineered networks from
cascading failure and isolation from a topological perspective.
In this work, we consider the following four research questions and corresponding
hypotheses. Firstly, can standard models of evaluation of multi-network vulnerabil-
ity to cascading failure that rely on the existence of one largest connected component
that remains in each network after losses lead to some substantial inaccuracies in
some circumstances? We suggest that, in cases of network topologies vulnerable to
fragmentation, modifying this model of robustness by allowing secondary compo-
nents to remain viable when measuring post-attack viability can make a significant
improvement. Secondly, if standard models of evaluation of multi-network vulnera-
bility define the coupling relationship between nodes belonging to different networks
to be one-to-one mappings, can allowing a node in given network to have multiple
counter parts in another network change the system significantly? We suggest that
it can have consequences on the way failure propagation is balanced between the
coupled networks. Thirdly, is the generalised assumption that partitioning between
network is a good way to decrease vulnerability to cascading failure in a network of
networks misleading? We suggest that, introducing isolation as a force as equally de-
structive as failure propagation can alter drastically where the optimum robustness
lies in such interconnected systems. Finally, we propose a solution to the consequent
problem of seemingly ever increasing vulnerability of interdependent networks to
both cascading failure and isolation: the use of permutable nodes that would give
such systems rewiring capabilities.
I order to address these questions, the paper is structured as follows: after briefly
expending on what the scope of this work does not cover ( we do not claim to map
interconnected abstract networks to real interdependent infrastructure networks),
we then suggest changes to improve shortcomings of the topologically centred eval-
uation of multi-network vulnerability. An overview of the design of models and
experiments is presented, as well as a description of the procedures, statistics, and
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metrics used to answer the research questions. Experimental results are then shown
and interpreted. Finally the significance of the new adopted assumptions is discussed
in term of changes to our understanding of the robustness of real interdependent
networks, while some of the shortcomings of this work are identified leading to
suggested potential improvements and novel avenues to explore.
The problem of mapping network theory to real-life
interconnected infrastructure networks
Although a promising modelling paradigm, the topologically centred evaluation of
multi-network vulnerability is still in infancy and has shown limits when trying to
model real world problems such as, for example, infrastructures power grids black-
outs [7] where the authors conclude that “evaluating vulnerability in power networks
using purely topological metrics can be misleading”. Another typical example of
graph theory used to try to model the resilience of an electric power networks can
be found in [8]. It presents the downside that it is mostly applied to DC (Direct
Current) models of power flow (a simplified representation [9] of the Alternative
Current or AC voltage). This limits the practical value of network theory as a high-
level modelling tool in this area as most of the power transmission systems in use
are based on AC. A long list of similar examples could be taken from the literature,
and confirm that, despite ongoing efforts, network theory is still a world apart from
practical engineering solutions.
But a closer look to the literature also provides examples of fundamental rules
derived from network theory in an abstract context that are applicable to real life
networks from a topological point of view. One example is the phenomenon of ampli-
fication of cascading failure in interconnected networks [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], and another
one the identification of the vulnerable portions of a network to different attacks by
looking at distinct measures of centrality. These measures vary from degree (number
of connections of a node), to betweeness-centrality and other complex and various
types of centrality [10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. From an attack/defense perspective these
measures are vital to locate critical nodes in a network [15, 16, 17].
Therefore, we first want to emphasize that the work presented in this paper does
not claim to analyse the functional robustness of real infrastructure networks, nor
does it try to model these from a risk analysis perspective based on practical engi-
neering concepts. We instead limit the scope of this work to study network topology
robustness to node removal. Nevertheless, we still believe that some of the findings
presented in this paper might present some useful insight in a practical engineering
context, in particular the fact that isolation can be as equally destructive as the
propagation of cascading failure when determining the topological robustness of in-
terdependent networks. One unexpectedly practical and perhaps potentially useful
find derived from this observation is the suggestion of permutable nodes as an adap-
tive mechanism that could optimise interdependent networks topological robustness.
Such a mechanism appears to protect coupled networks from the destructive conse-
quences of isolation and cascading failure and at the same time preserves network
resources by limiting the amount of redundancy needed to absorb a disturbance. In
other words, while nodes that can provide simultaneous links to different networks
tend to propagate cascading failure .i.e an electric line that would carry phone com-
munications at the same time would in fact propagate topological failure through
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both phone and electricity networks in case of malfunction while, on the other hand,
nodes that can provide alternated states of coupling to different networks limit the
topological propagation of cascading failure while providing an alternate configu-
ration to the system because of their rewiring capabilities .i.e. roads convertible to
landing strips, the Stormwater Management and Road Tunnel (SMART) in Kuala
Lumpur (a tunnel that can alternate between traffic and storm water management),
energy storage devices on board electric vehicles that can be plugged to the power
grid when not in use so as to store and produce energy whenever needed, or plants
that generate electricity for production and that can shut down production and sell
power instead.
Four suggested changes to improve models of the robustness of
network of networks to cascading failure
Some of the shortcomings of the topologically centred evaluation of multi-network
vulnerability as a modelling tool are rooted in the existence of assumptions that sim-
plify the nature and extent of network interdependency and the rules that establish
the post-attack viability of a connected component. In order to increase the realism
of existing models of robustness of interdependent networks, we change these as-
sumptions as follows: firstly, we propose to allow secondary components to remain
viable when simulating cascading failure. Secondly, we introduce many-to-one in-
terdependent mappings and analyse the consequences of allowing a node in given
network to have multiple counter parts in another network. Thirdly, we present a
measure of the symbiotic viability of network components when faced with isola-
tion that results in novel strategies on how to achieve robustness in interdependent
complex networks. Finally, we also propose a solution to the consequent problem
of seemingly ever increasing vulnerability of interconnected networks introduced by
these symbiotic dependencies: the introduction of permutable nodes that would give
such systems rewiring capabilities.
Suggested change to the first assumption: changing the post-attack viability when
secondary components remain viable
The first assumption found in many contemporary models of multi-network re-
silience relates to post-attack viability. Robustness has generally been evaluated
using an iterative cascading failure process based on percolation theory where only
the one largest connected component remains in each network after losses. Usually,
no secondary component is considered alive [1, 4, 2, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. The
first modification suggested in this work is to allow secondary components to remain
viable when estimating the robustness of a system. When evaluating the robustness
of coupled networks, the standard approach [1, 4, 2, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24] has
been to measure the size of the one largest connected component remaining in each
interdependent network. This way of evaluating a pair of coupled networks ignores
secondary components and their potential influence on the post-attack performance
on such a system. However, in fragmented networks, the presence of secondary clus-
ters could significantly increase system performance (as illustrated in the first row
of Figure 1). Consequently, we propose to evaluate the post-attack viability of a
network by summing up the relative sizes of all components above some critical
minimum number of nodes.
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Suggested change to the second assumption: changing dependency links from
one-to-one to one-to-many mappings between networks
A second assumption widely in use in state of the art models representing inter-
network dependencies [1, 2, 3, 25] defines the coupling relationship between nodes
belonging to different networks to be one-to-one mappings (e.g. a node from net-
work A is coupled to a unique distinct node in a network B). Existing work tends
to focus on varying the density, the correlation structure, and the directed versus
undirected character of dependencies in order to analyse their effects on network
dynamics. Hence, scenarios where several nodes from one network are likely to be
coupled to one single node in the other network (no many-to-one relationship) have
not yet been fully explored. We change the nature of network interdependency by
allowing a node in given network to have multiple counter parts in another network
(many-to-one mapping). Existing work [1, 2, 3, 26] generally links interdependent
networks with one-to-one mappings (i.e. nodes in network A have a unique counter-
part in network B). A reason for that situation is that present mathematical frame-
works tend to use generating functions to predict the size of the largest remaining
component after cascading failure and these are constructed with the assumption
that “each node in network B depends exactly on one node from network A” [1].
Although this assumption was relaxed in further work such as [26] by stating that
a fraction of nodes in A could be coupled with nodes in B, it remains that if one
wish to use the generating functions in their present form, nodes in one network
cannot have several counterparts in another network. Another reason explaining the
absence of multiple mappings is the very large size of the parameter space needed to
build interdependent networks and the high computational cost of running simula-
tions that so far have prevented the exploration of this particular feature. Assuming
the prevalence of one to one mappings between coupled networks does not fit with
the fact that many nodes in infrastructure networks can have multiple dependencies
(i.e. an airport might require connections to multiple power nodes). Consequently,
here we explore a scenario where many-to-one mapping are possible between inter-
connected networks (i.e. a node in network B has in average m supporting nodes
from A where m > 1). In this work, a many-to-one mapping was chosen, but a
one-to-many mapping (with 0 < m < 1) is another alternative way of coupling
networks that could potentially be explored in future work. Figure 2 shows how
failure propagates between networks through undirected dependency in that type
of scenario.
Suggested change to the third assumption: changing the post-attack viability by
taking into account symbiotic interdependency
Symbiotic networks are networks that need to be mutually connected in order to
be viable. In this scenario, a connected component (i.e., a network fragment) in one
network is viable only if a minimum fraction of its nodes are connected to a sur-
viving network component from the other network. Connected components in both
infrastructure networks are subject to this survival constraint. A third assumption
is that there is no gradient in the degree of isolation that could influence the vi-
ability of a symbiotic clusters: research focuses on the limited case where either
clusters are never isolated from the other network (when all nodes in A are linked
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to nodes in B) or clusters can stay alive even if isolated from their counter-part
network [1, 2, 3, 26]. Consequently, the lesser the connections between networks,
the smaller the probability of cascading failure due to node removal, and the greater
the topological robustness of such systems [26, 18, 27, 28, 29]. We present a novel
measure of the symbiotic viability of network components when faced with isola-
tion that results in novel strategies on how to achieve robustness. Previous studies
have evaluated the post-attack performance of a pair of interdependent networks,
A and B, by measuring the size of the remaining connected component(s) in each
network after cascading failure. This calculation has ignored the extent to which
either of these components is connected to surviving nodes in the other network and
assumes implicitly either that clusters are never isolated (if all A nodes are linked
to a B nodes) [1, 3], or that a cluster of surviving B nodes can exist as a viable
network in the absence of any connection to the A network, and vice versa [26]. As
a consequence, standard analysis shows that reducing the number of interdepen-
dencies between A and B is a good way of improving system resilience, since when
one network is attacked the other is shielded from the consequences. However, this
approach to measuring post-attack viability does not take into account a gradient
in the possible degrees of isolation and their impact on the symbiotic nature of sys-
tems. For example, in modern infrastructures, a railway network cannot survive in
complete isolation from a road transport network because it needs the road network
to deliver a minimum amount of passengers, goods, and personnel in order to oper-
ate. Consequently, here we evaluate the symbiotic post-attack viability of a network
by measuring the size of the largest component that meets a dependency threshold
expressed in terms of the proportion of nodes within the component that are con-
nected to at least one surviving node in the other network. Setting the threshold at
10%, for instance, demands that in order for a network B component to be viable,
at least 10% of its nodes must be connected to a surviving A node, i.e., an A node
that itself is within a component that meets the 10% interdependency threshold.
This requirement for the viability of a connected component can be expressed as
the dependency threshold Γ, that is to say, the ratio of nodes in this component
that are connected to other live clusters. The symbiotic viability condition for a
given component can be defined in its simplest form as maintaining the coupling
ratio of the component above an interdependency threshold Γ and can be expressed
by the following equation:
∑q
i=1 Wi∑q
i=1 Wi +
∑q¯
j=1 Wj
≥ Γ (1)
Where q is the number of nodes in this component which are coupled to another
component from a different complementary network, q¯ is the number of uncoupled
nodes, Γ is the interdependency threshold below which the component is not viable,
and each coupled node i has a weight wi while each uncoupled node j has a weight
wj (so as to quantify how important or vital some nodes are compared to each
other). In this work, we study the robustness of complex interdependent networks
by using a simplified version of the symbiotic viability condition detailed above:
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we consider the case where all nodes have an equal weight an can then rewrite the
condition as:
q
q + q¯
≥ Γ (2)
A suggested solution to decrease the vulnerability of interdependent networks to
cascading failure: permutable nodes
Finally, we propose a solution to the consequent problem of seemingly ever in-
creasing vulnerability of interconnected networks introduced by multiple symbiotic
dependencies: the use of permutable nodes that would give such systems rewiring
capabilities akin to those found in the human brain. We use the measure of symbiotic
viability detailed in equation 2 to evaluate the post-attack viability of symbiotic
networks. There are only two ways to increase the viability condition expressed by
this coupling ratio: either add extra coupled nodes to a component to increase the
weighted sum in the numerator, or remove uncoupled nodes to reduce the weighted
sum in the denominator. One way to achieve this is to treat coupled and uncoupled
nodes like valuable resources that can be exchanged between mutually connected
components via the creation of permutable infrastructure nodes. An abstract exam-
ple of such a mechanism could be the training of defending players that could alter-
nate between the roles of midfielders and strikers inside a football team. Although
they might be less efficient as defenders, their ability to occupy other positions
would make their team more resilient if some strikers were taken out of the game. If
a permutable node is active in one network, its counter-part in another network is
inactive and vice versa. When permutation occurs, the active side changes allowing
the allocation of a node from one non-essential role in one network to a potentially
crucially needed position in another. There can be permutation between coupled
nodes, between uncoupled nodes, or between uncoupled and coupled nodes. Per-
mutation between coupled nodes is only useful when several remaining components
can exist in each network. In this limited specific case, interdependent links can be
“rewired” and exchanged as a valuable resource between components of different
networks so as to preserve viability. Permutation between uncoupled nodes shown
in figure 3 is only possible when one of the components can absorb the accumu-
lated loss resulting from the deactivation of the uncoupled nodes. This renders this
permutation more difficult to achieve, because in order to obtain the same increase
in the coupling ratio, the minimum required number of uncoupled nodes to remove
from the denominator is much higher than to the number of coupled nodes one
has to add in the numerator. One advantage of swapping uncoupled nodes is that
it minimises the vulnerability to cascading failure because we do not increase the
number of interdependencies.
Design of models and experiments
We consider two coupled networks A and B of same size N . The coupled networks
sizes considered was N = 500, so as to guarantee computational feasibility while
keeping generalisable topologic features. Four different types of network topologies
are explored: Erdos Reyni, Watts Strogattz, Barabasi Albert, and ring lattice. We
deliberately chose these as they are well known and are affected in distinctive ways
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when confronted to random attacks [30]. Different versions of these paired networks
are built, each one with an average degree k varying from 4 to 24 in order to show
the effects of internal network redundancy over the robustness of the whole system.
The degree of coupling between the networks is defined by the fraction q of nodes in
network A that are linked to nodes in network B, as in [25] that includes descriptions
of a similar setting. The links between the networks are constructed with a coupling
degree q varying (through a range of 19 evenly spaced values) from 0.05 to 1.0, in
order to show the effects of network interdependency over the robustness score.
Regarding the correlation of inter-network dependencies, nodes that are linked to
another network are selected at random.
Failure propagates between networks through undirected dependency (i.e. if one
node in A that is linked to another node in B is disabled, then the node in B will also
be disabled). The robustness of interdependent networks is evaluated by attacking
one network and then by looking at the post-attack viability of both networks after
cascading failure. The initial attack is always done by selecting a fraction (1− p) of
randomly chosen nodes in network A.
When secondary components remain viable, the algorithm that evaluate the num-
ber of active nodes left in both networks after attack differs from standard proce-
dure in one aspect: it does not prune anymore all secondary components with the
attached iterative failure propagation. Instead, any component that is above a cer-
tain minimum number of nodes is kept and considered live. In our experiments, any
secondary component whose size is superior to three nodes is considered alive.
One-to-many mappings are created by choosing at random a certain number n of
distinct nodes in network A, and then choosing a corresponding number of randomly
selected coupled nodes in network B, with no obligation for them to be distinct from
each other, and then creating coupling links between them. This produces many
instances of nodes in network A that depend on multiple coupled nodes in network
B. Failure propagation between networks follows the same rule for both one-to-one
and many-to-one mappings: for each network node to operate, all of the nodes upon
which it depends must be also be operational.
When taking into account the effects of isolation as a destructive force as well as
the propagation of cascading failure, the post attack viability of connected compo-
nents is evaluated as described in the algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Evaluate symbiotic viability
Require: S, a set of components of networks A and B
Attack S and update S equal cascading failure(S)
Set there are still components to check to TRUE
while there are still components to check flag is TRUE do
Set there are still components to check flag to FALSE
for each component, c ∈ S do
if proportion of coupled nodes, qc/nc, is inferior to Γ then
Disable all nodes in the component
Disable any dependent nodes in other components
Propagate cascading failure and update S throughout cascading failure(S)
Set there are still components to check flag to TRUE
end if
end for
end while
return Viability(remaining components)
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When we use permutable nodes to decrease the vulnerability of interdependent
networks to cascading failure, we first evaluate the symbiotic post-attack viability
of connected components, and if these connected components are damaged, we then
set to switch permutable nodes in a process as described by algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Permute node roles
Require: S, a set of components of networks A and B
Get list of permutable nodes in S
for each component, c ∈ S do
while proportion of coupled nodes, qc/nc, is inferior to Γ do
Permute a new random permutable node out of c (unless by doing so it would have no living
neighbours)
end while
end for
Set V = Evaluate Symbiotic Viability(S)
Permutation between uncoupled and coupled nodes as shown in figure 4 generally
offers a significant increase of the coupling ratio in both networks for the smallest
number of permutations as shown in the result section. We evaluate the change in
post-attack viability of symbiotic networks (expressed in equation 2 and imple-
mented as in algorithm 1) over a hundred trials triggered by the introduction of
permutable nodes for different values of the dependency threshold (0.1 for a weak
symbiotic interdependency, 0.3 for an intermediate value, and 0.5 for a strong sym-
biosis). Each coupled network has a size of 100 nodes, a coupling degree of 0.5, and a
fraction of swappable nodes equal to 40%. Two types of permutation are considered:
either between uncoupled nodes, or between uncoupled and coupled nodes. In each
case, we show the percentages of coupled networks prevented from being destroyed
after attack, the average number of nodes saved per trial, and the frequency of dead
networks saved for each attack degree.
The resulting size of the parameter space is such that around 1675800 simulations
of cascading failure have to be run every time we change the nature of network
interdependency or the post-attack viability rules. The IRIDIS High Performance
Computing Facility available at the University of Southampton, was used over a pe-
riod of several weeks in order to complete this work using the Python programming
language. Results are saved in multidimensional arrays for each combination of the
following experimental parameters: network type, network degree, coupling degree
, attack degree, and run number. The values saved are the number of active nodes
left, the transitivity, the average shortest path length, and the degree histogram for
each network, but also for each connected component inside each network. In the
experiments described below, we only use the number of active nodes left in both
networks as raw data. The complete data sets are quite extensive (in total around
20 Gigabytes) are available as well as the Python code leading to their production
upon contacting the authors.
Procedures, statistics, and metrics used to answer the research
questions
The robustness of the system is expressed as the area under the curve defined by
the fraction of nodes still alive in each network for a degree of attack (1−p) varying
(through a range of 21 evenly spaced values) from 0 to 1.0.
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Let Rs be the standard measure of the robustness of a system of interdependent
networks based on the size of the one largest remaining connected component in
each interdependent network. Let 1 − p be the attack size, and P (1 − p) be the
relative size of the largest connected cluster in a network after failure. Rs is the
area under the curve defined by the fraction of nodes still alive in each network for
varying degrees of attack can be expressed as follows in equation 3:
Rs =
∫ 1.0
1−p=0
P (1− p) (3)
Let Rm be the robustness of a system of interdependent network obtained by
measuring the aggregate of the sums of the relative sizes of all components above
some critical minimum number of nodes. Let S(1 − p, Cmin) be the sum of the
relative sizes of connected clusters above or equal a minimum critical size Cmin in
a network after attack. Rm can be expressed as follows in equation 4:
Rm =
∫ 1.0
1−p=0
S(1− p, Cmin) (4)
Rs and Rm values are used to plot respectively the single and multiple cluster
measurements of robustness throughout the whole parameter space over these 25
runs. Each robustness value is represented by a colored cell in a heatmap, where the
position along the horizontal axis expresses the average internal degrees for each
network, and the position along the vertical axis expresses the degree of coupling
between the networks. (See figures in result section).
Let ∆R be the difference of robustness between multiple and single cluster mea-
surement. ∆R = Rm −Rs can be defined as follows in equation 5:
∆R =
∫ 1.0
1−p=0
[S(1− p, Cmin)− P (1− p)] (5)
∆R values are used in figure 6 to show directly show the difference of robustness
between multiple and single cluster measurement for different topologies. Negative
values are represented by a different color gradient (here white to black) than pos-
itive values (here red to yellow).
A similar approach is taken to show the difference of robustness between one-to-
one and many-to-one interdependent mappings as shown in figure 10.
The robustness is evaluated over 25 runs, where for each run, new networks are
generated. Average value, standard deviation, and the p value obtained by t-test
are then obtained to compare the robustness in systems with a different network
interdependency or the post-attack viability rule and produce more standard graphs
such as the bar charts seen in the results section.
Results presentation and interpretation
In the following, we will present our analysis of the difference in robustness that
results from the changes outlined above over the standard assumptions simplifying
the nature and extent of network interdependency and the rules that establish the
post-attack viability of a connected component.
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Change in robustness when secondary components are viable
In this section, we attempt to find if there is a significant difference of robustness
when considering secondary components as viable instead of just the one single
largest remaining connected component in each network. Existing work [31] has
observed that network fragmentation results in a distribution of various cluster
sizes (e.g. when a gaint component exist, the second is significantly smaller than
the largest one, etc...). Still, even if secondary components are small, if there are
enough of them, they can have a potentially important supporting role regarding
the robustness of a coupled system. Results from figure 5 show that there does
not seem to be a significant difference between single and multiple components
evaluation for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and Baraba`si-Albert pairs of networks (a one-tail t-test
shows an average p-value superior to 0.1). On the other hand, tolerating secondary
components seems to increase significantly (for a t-test p value <0.005) the post
attack performance of Watts-Strogatz, and ring lattice topologies.
There is nearly no null or negative difference in Watts-Strogatz, and ring lattice
networks, showing that robustness using multiple components is systematically out-
performing the single component robustness for these topologies. It is also worth
noticing that for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and Baraba`si-Albert networks, the maximum differ-
ence of robustness is less than is 5%, while for network topologies more vulnerable
to fragmentation such as Watts-Strogatz, and ring lattice, the maximum difference
is more than 30%. Networks with lower average degree tend to fragment more easily
after attack, and results show that the lower the degree k, the higher the chance
that multi-component robustness will significantly outperform the single component
robustness. This can be explained by the fact that, when under attack, networks
with lower internal connectivity tend to transform into a collection of disconnected
components. In this situation, measuring the one largest remaining component and
ignoring all secondary clusters leads to a significant difference in the evaluation of
robustness. The easier to fragment a network is, the greater the influence exerted
by these secondary components on the functional integrity of an infrastructure net-
work.
Change in robustness when one node can have multiple counter parts in another
network
Initial results from figure 7 show that there does noes seem to be a significant
difference of overall robustness between multiple (a node in network B has in average
m supporting nodes from A where m > 1) and unique (m=1) dependencies. Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi, Baraba`si-Albert, Watts-Strogatz, and ring lattice topologies show seemingly
identical results.
On the other hand, when comparing the robustness of individual networks, a
significant difference seems to emerge as shown in figure 8. In the case of the many-
to-one mapping explored by linking unique nodes in A to randomly chosen nodes
in B, the percolation damages seem to be increased in network A and decreased in
network B. A typical example of such phenomena can be observed in figure 9 that
shows the difference of robustness between many-to-one and one-to-one mappings
for both Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks of average degree k = 4 and q = 1.0. Failure will
spread to a greater portion of network A, while a smaller fraction of B will be
damaged.
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In the case of a many-to-one mapping, linking unique nodes in A to randomly
chosen nodes in B seems to be transfer the effects of percolation back to A. Further
results shown in figure 10 support this hypothesis as the heat-maps representing
the differences of robustness between multiple and single dependency mappings
showing predominantly gray scales for network A (negative differences) and mostly
red and orange areas for network B (positive differences). This can be explained by
the fact that, when under attack, the network A has multiple nodes that depend
on a failure from a single node in B. Therefore, it has less chance to preserve a
remaining component as the propagation of cascading failure is amplified. On the
other hand, there is a greater chance that a portion of network B will remain
untouched because a smaller number of nodes in B are coupled to potential failures
in A. This result seem to indicate that a many to one mapping can be used as an
effective control mechanism to transfer damages due to cascading failure from one
network to another.
A measure of symbiotic post-attack viability and resulting novel strategies to achieve
robustness
In this scenario, a connected component is viable only if a minimum fraction of its
nodes are connected to another surviving cluster in a different network. This other
cluster is itself subject to the same survival condition. This requirement for the
viability of a connected component can be expressed as the dependency threshold
Γ, that is to say, the ratio of nodes in this component that are connected to other
live clusters.
Figure 11 shows that than when components need to meet a dependency threshold
Γ = 0.1, the robustness expressed by the area under the curve measuring the fraction
of nodes still alive in network B for varying degrees of attack is significantly smaller
than in the standard case where the post-attack viability of remaining components
is not affected by their isolation (for Γ = 0). This indicates that there might be
a very different optimum when looking at the landscape of robustness scores if a
symbiotic post-attack viability rule is chosen.
Figure 12 confirms that using standard and symbiotic interdependency results in
different robustness landscapes. Post-attack viability is plotted in function of the
degree of coupling q and the average degree k in two interdependent Baraba`si-Albert
networks. The standard measure of post-attack viability (Γ = 0) shows an optimum
robustness score at the bottom of the heat map where the degree of coupling is at its
lowest. On the other hand, when the viability of a cluster is linked to a dependency
threshold Γ = 0.1 or Γ = 0.2, the heat map shows that the robustness score is
optimal when q is between some intermediary values (in this particular case, 0.35
and 0.6). This optimum range of values changes depending of the value of Γ. The
Dark blue area at the very bottom shows a region where the robustness score is null
because the degree of coupling between networks being inferior to the dependency
threshold, the networks end up isolated. Simulations results have shown that the
size of this ”null-viability” area grows linearly with Γ. Incidentally, similar results
are observable for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi, Baraba`si-Albert , Watts-Strogatz, and ring lattice,
suggesting a new landscape of robustness that has features independent from the
network topology considered.
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Figure 13 emphasizes how the introduction of various level of symbiotic interde-
pendency changes the relationship between robustness and coupling. The robustness
of two interdependent networks A and B with respect to the degree of coupling q
is shown for scenarios where the value of Γ ranges from 0 (standard post-attack
viability) up to 0.5 (at least half of a cluster needs to be connected to another
network to be alive). For Γ = 0, the optimum robustness is attained for the low-
est possible coupling value q = 0. For cases where Γ > 0, the optimal robustness
does not lie where q = 0, but soars as soon as the minimum amount of coupling
is reached in order to prevent isolation, then quickly reaches a maximum value,
and finally gradually converges to lower average values corresponding to a situation
where the increased coupling has amplified cascading failure and lead to a lower per-
colation threshold. Figure 14 shows that even for very different network topologies,
the average robustness of the system always decreases when the symbiotic viability
condition expressed by the dependency threshold Γ increases because the condi-
tions for post-attack viability are made more stringent. This result may have wide
implications, because it demonstrates that the dynamic process of fragmentation
decouples interdependent networks during a cascading failure is as important as
the process of percolating failure within each network when it comes to quantifying
and predicting the resilience of interdependent networks. This implies that systems
built to rely on the combined availability of different resources such as transport,
power, ICT, and water can only become increasingly vulnerable to catastrophic
failure. Unfortunately, this propensity of modern infrastructure systems to require
an increasing number of services to work together in order to function is not likely
to reverse. In this context, one important question one might ask is: is there a prac-
tical and feasible way to reduce the vulnerability of such systems to both isolation
and cascading failure? In the next section we propose one possible solution to this
problem: giving infrastructure networks rewiring capabilities akin to those found in
the human brain by introducing nodes with permutable roles.
Change in symbiotic post-attack viability when infrastructure nodes have permutable
roles
Figure 15 shows that the permutation between uncoupled nodes results in an in-
crease in the chance to save the largest remaining component in each network
(+1.8% for a low symbiotic interdependency, +9.8% for a medium value, and +3%
for a high value of Γ), and that the permutation between uncoupled and coupled
nodes results in a large gain in viability(+7% for a low symbiotic interdependency,
+24.3% for a medium value, and +32.5% for a high value of Γ). Also, in the first
type of permutation, maximum gain is obtained for a medium symbiotic interde-
pendency, while in the latter, the best gain happens for a high symbiotic interdepen-
dency. This can be explained because in order to obtain an increase in the coupling
ratio expressed by the symbiotic viability condition, the minimum required number
of uncoupled nodes to remove from the denominator via the first type of permuta-
tion is much higher than the minimum required number of coupled nodes that can
be added in the numerator via the second type of permutation. When using per-
mutation between uncoupled nodes, components have to absorb the accumulated
loss resulting from the deactivation of uncoupled nodes, generally only few of them
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can be sacrificed, and therefore this results in modest gains of viability unlikely to
be sufficient for stringent conditions imposed by a high symbiotic viability. On the
other hand, as the second type of permutation generally offers a significant increase
of the coupling ratio in both networks for a smaller number of permutations, it
offers a better gain of viability for Γ=0.5.
Figures 16 shows that the average number of nodes saved per trial (reflecting the
size of the largest remaining components) is relatively small for permutations be-
tween uncoupled nodes (18 for a low symbiotic interdependency, 129 for a medium
value, and 57 for a high value of Γ) and quite large for permutations between
uncoupled and coupled nodes (70 for a low symbiotic interdependency, 297 for a
medium value, and 539 for a high value of Γ). Figures 17 shows that the percentage
of dead networks saved per attack degree follows different distributions depending
on the type of permutation and the level of symbiotic interdependency. For per-
mutations between uncoupled nodes, the percentages of saved networks are lower
and distributed over narrower ranges of attack degrees, indicating that viability
gains are more difficult to achieve. For permutations between uncoupled nodes and
coupled nodes, the percentages of saved networks are higher and distributed over
larger ranges of attack degrees, indicating that viability gains are easier to achieve.
Scenarios with an intermediate value of Γ and a medium attack degree exhibit the
highest frequency of saved networked: up to around 65% of dead networks can be
saved for an attack degree of 0.6 in the case of the permutation between uncoupled
nodes, and up to 95% of dead networks can be saved for an attack degree of 0.65
for permutations between uncoupled and coupled nodes. When the attack degree
is low, there is little room for viability gain because in most cases, the remaining
connected components are alive, while when the attack degree is high, the remain-
ing components are smaller and more isolated which results in a symbiotic viability
condition more difficult to achieve with the rapidly shrinking number of permutable
nodes left alive. Permutation will therefore grant a symbiotic interdependent system
the greatest gain in viability for a combination of intermediate values of attack and
a moderately stringent interdependency threshold condition Γ.
Discussion
We have presented changes to ways to define network interdependency and post-
attack viability that significantly impact the topological robustness of coupled net-
works to random attacks from our simulation results. We have first shown that the
topological robustness of more easily fragmented interconnected networks topologies
(such as Watts Strogattz and ring lattices topologies) can be significantly improved
by allowing multiple largest remaining components to be viable. This points to the
possibility that in easily fragmented networks, granting secondary, and by exten-
sion smaller connected components a greater viability could enhance significantly
the robustness of the whole system. Furthermore, we have provided evidence that
allowing a node in a given network to have multiple counter parts in another net-
work (many-to-one mapping) can be an effective way to transfer damages due to
cascading failure from one network to another without changing the robustness
of the overall system. This observation could lead speculate on the possibility of
creating mechanisms of damage transfer, similar to the way water is transferred
Khoury et al. Page 15 of 20
betweeen ballasts in a ship, but instead applied to shifting damages due to cascad-
ing failure in sub-networks. We have also observed that, in symbiotic networks, the
highest robustness cannot be achieved just by increasing partitioning that would
result in cutting off entire sub-networks, but rather by finding an optimal degree
of coupling that simultaneously minimises the negative impact of isolation while
limiting the probability of spreading cascading failure. If we were to speculate on
how to translate this topological observation to the domain of functional robustness
of infrastructure networks, we would observe that cascading failure being inherent
to symbiotic interdependency, the more an infrastructure depends on connections
between multiple different types of services in order to function properly, the more
likely failure is to spread iteratively through different parts of a system during pe-
riods of stress or perturbation. The apparent propensity of modern infrastructure
systems to require an increasing number of services to function together is likely
to amplify that significant problem. One way to reduce the impact of the resulting
symbiotic interdependency could be to design infrastructure nodes that can switch
between different roles across distinct interdependent networks, such that they have
the capacity to be functionally permutable. This mean that these nodes should not
fulfil simultaneously multiple roles (e.g., dual infrastructures), but rather that they
would have the ability to perform only one type of alternate service at any par-
ticular time. These rewiring capabilities akin to those found in the human brain
could possibly give infrastructure networks the capacity to adapt while limiting the
topological sensitivity to disruption associated with symbiotic interdependency.
While our simulation results can provide some insight into how isolation and other
mechanisms can affect robustness in interdependent networks, there are substantial
limitations to their applicability and generality. So far, we have limited our anal-
ysis to a pair of coupled networks, but real-world problems can display a dizzying
number of interconnected systems. In such cases, the viability of a component will
not just depend on being connected to only one other network, but to many more.
With the increase of the dimensionality of dependency thresholds, the robustness of
the whole system might become drastically lower.If the effects of high-dimensional
dependency thresholds over the robustness of such systems are so far not explored,
the implications of a one-dimensional dependency threshold as shown in this pa-
per are already far reaching. Moreover, our models are biased in that choosing the
nodes coupled between networks randomly does not necessarily reflect the attach-
ment preferences encountered in real world cases. Other selection strategies such
as correlation based on nodes with the highest degree, or the highest betweenness
centrality, or even spatially embedded networks [5, 12, 13, 14] would result in dif-
ferent biases. Similarly, one could argue that random attacks are just one way to
destroy the networks, and that other attack strategies based on different measures
of centrality or system load as in [32] might give a different view of the problem.
The proposed introduction of permutable nodes that would give interconnected sys-
tems rewiring capabilities, and guarantee a higher symbiotic viability seems sound
from a topological point of view, but would require some feasibility study from the
point of view of functional robustness and cost implications to make it applicable
to real-life networks such as the industrial complex when day to day operations
depend on the simultaneous availability of multiple technologies, ecosystems where
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the mutually dependent species cannot exist in isolation, or mutually dependent
transport networks.
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Figures
Figure 1 single versus multiple components post attack viability We visualise what is left of
interdependent networks after attack depending on different post-attack viability rules: single
versus multiple components tolerated, and isolated versus dependent clusters.
Figure 2 Failure propagation between networks through undirected dependency: one-to-one
and many-to-one mapping situations
Figure 3 One example case of the influence of node permutability on post attack viability We
use a permutable node in components with the following symbiotic viability condition: a
component is only alive if at least 1/3 of its nodes are connected to other network. The large
network diagrams on the left represent the two different alternative networks made possible by
swapping the states of the permutable node. In the first alternative scenario, this uncoupled node
can be activated in the grey network, with an extra internal (blue) edge. In the second alternative
situation, the grey network node is disabled and the node counter-part in the black network is
activated. Disabled nodes and connections in each alternative scenario are shown with dashed
lines. After applying the post-attack viability rule, alternative 2 seems to leave the coupled
networks in a much better state than alternative 1.
Figure 4 A different example case of the influence of node permutability on post attack
viability We use a permutable node that can switch from an uncoupled to a coupled counter-part
in components with the following symbiotic viability condition: a component is only alive if at
least 1/3 of its nodes are connected to other network. The large network diagrams on the left
represent the two different alternative networks made possible by swapping the states of the
permutable node. Either the uncoupled counter-part of the node is activated in the black network,
or the counter-part in the grey network is activated with an associated interdependent (black)
edge, and an extra internal (blue) edge. Disabled nodes and connections in each alternative
scenario are shown with dashed lines. After applying the post-attack viability rule, alternative 2
seems to leave the coupled networks in a much better state than alternative 1.
Figure 5 Robustness with secondary components versus robustness with single largest
remaining connected component
Figure 6 Difference between multiple and single cluster measurement of robustness for
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi, Baraba`si-Albert, Watts-Strogatz, and ring lattice topologies. Each coloured
heat-map cell represents the average of the difference of robustness ∆R between multiple and
single cluster measurements for 25 pairs of random 500-node networks in function of the degree of
coupling between A and B and the average degree of each network. The gray scale expresses
negative differences while the coloured scale expresses positive differences.
Figure 7 Difference between multiple and unique dependencies when considering the global
average robustness of all networks
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Figure 8 Difference between multiple and unique dependencies when considering the
robustness of individual networks
Figure 9 Robustness of each coupled Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network ( k = 4 and q = 1.0): multiple
versus unique dependencies
Figure 10 Difference of robustness between between many-to-one and one-to-one dependency
mappings for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi, Baraba`si-Albert, Watts-Strogatz, and ring lattice topologies. Each
coloured heat-map cell represents the average of the difference of robustness between multiple and
single dependency mappings for 25 pairs of random 500-node networks in function of the degree
of coupling between A and B and the average degree of each network. The gray scale expresses
negative differences while the coloured scale expresses positive differences.
Figure 11 Robustness of coupled networks: impact of the dependency threshold requirement
We compare the robustness - here, the area under the curve defined by the fraction of nodes still
alive in network B for varying degrees of attack on network A - of coupled Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (a),
Baraba`si-Albert (b), Watts-Strogatz (c), and ring lattice (d) networks for standard post-attack
viability (for Γ = 0), and when components need to meet a dependency threshold Γ = 0.1.
Figure 12 Measures of post-attack viability for two interdependent Baraba`si-Albert networks.
The heat-maps represent respectively the post attack viability for networks A and B where
clusters can survive isolated (Γ = 0) or where they can only be alive if they meet a dependency
threshold Γ = 0.1, and 0.2. Each coloured heat-map cell represents the mean aggregate
post-attack viability of 25 pairs of random 500-node Baraba`si-Albert networks in function of the
degree of coupling between A and B and the average degree of each network.
Figure 13 Plotting the robustness of coupled Erdo˝s-Re´nyi, Baraba`si-Albert, Watts-Strogatz,
and ring lattice networks in function of their degree of coupling q. For each network, the
average degree k = 4. The different types of lines mean that different post-attack viability rules
are used to compute the robustness where the dependency threshold Γ can vary from 0 (isolated
components are tolerated) to 0.5 (at least half of a cluster needs to be connected to another
network to be alive)
Figure 14 Plotting the robustness of two interdependent networks (Erdo˝s-Re´nyi,
Baraba`si-Albert, Watts-Strogatz, and ring lattice) in function of the dependency threshold Γ.
Each robustness score corresponds to the average of all the robustness values obtained for each
degree of coupling between 0.05 and 1.0.
Figure 15 Percentages of coupled networks prevented from being destroyed after attack when
using permutation between uncoupled nodes (a) and permutation between uncoupled and
coupled nodes (b) for low (Γ=0.1), medium (Γ=0.3), and high (Γ=0.5) symbiotic
interdependency values.
Figure 16 The average number of nodes saved per trial when using permutation between
uncoupled nodes (a) and permutation between uncoupled and coupled nodes (b) for low
(Γ=0.1), medium (Γ=0.3), and high (Γ=0.5) symbiotic interdependency values.
Figure 17 The frequency of dead networks saved for each attack degree when using
permutation between uncoupled nodes (a) and permutation between uncoupled and coupled
nodes (b) for low (Γ=0.1), medium (Γ=0.3), and high (Γ=0.5) symbiotic interdependency
values.
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